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Many complex networks exhibit vulnerability to spreading of epidemics, and such vulnerability
relates to the viral strain as well as to the network characteristics. For instance, the structure of
the network plays an important role in spreading of epidemics. Additionally, properties of previous
epidemic models require prior knowledge of the complex network structure, which means the models
are limited to only well-known network structures. In this paper, we propose a new epidemiological
SIR model based on the continuous time Markov chain, which is generalized to any type of network.
The new model is capable of evaluating the states of every individual in the network. Through
mathematical analysis, we prove an epidemic threshold exists below which an epidemic does not
propagate in the network. We also show that the new epidemic threshold is inversely proportional
to the spectral radius of the network. In particular, we employ the new epidemic model as a
novel measure to assess the vulnerability of networks to the spread of epidemics. The new measure
considers all possible effective infection rates that an epidemic might possess. Next, we apply the
measure to correlated networks to evaluate the vulnerability of disassortative and assortative scale-
free networks. Ultimately, we verify the accuracy of the theoretical epidemic threshold through
extensive numerical simulations. Within the set of tested networks, the numerical results show that
disassortative scale-free networks are more vulnerable to spreading of epidemics than assortative
scale-free networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Complex networks, such as social networks [1–4], food-
webs [5], biological networks [6–10], the world-wide-web
(WWW), and the Internet, largely represent many sys-
tems from a topological structure point of view. In-
herently, a complex network has many dynamics that
describe the state of the system and its functionality.
Among these dynamics, the spread of epidemics pro-
cess has attracted the attention of many researchers
in multidisciplinary fields. Essentially, epidemics, like
human contagious, are represented by the standard
compartmental epidemiological model so-called suscepti-
ble/infected/removed (SIR), which emulates the spread
process.
The SIR model analytically reveals how an individ-
ual’state is changed among the three SIR states in the
complex networks. To clarify, during the spread of an
epidemic, an individual is in one of the three SIR states.
First, a susceptible individual can receive the infection
from an infectious neighbor and become infected. Ac-
cordingly, the infected individual becomes infectious with
infection rate β. Also, an infected individual can cure it-
self with a cure rate δ. The curing process represents
either the death (removal) or the complete recovery of
the individual after the infection. Additionally, the ratio
between β and δ is called the effective infection rate. An
epidemic threshold τ is a specific value of the effective
infection rate above which an epidemic outbreak takes
place. Moreover, it is a function of the network charac-
teristics.
Different SIR models are applied to some classes of com-
plex networks [11–21] depending on the network char-
acteristics. Early SIR models are homogeneous, i.e., all
individuals have a similar probability of being infected
and infectious. On the other hand, SIR models are
also applied on structured networks considering the lo-
cal connectivity of the network’s individuals. For exam-
ple, scale-free (SF) networks, which are networks own-
ing power-law node degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−2−ν
with 0 < ν ≤ 1, show a high level of vulnerability to
the spreading of epidemics due to highly heterogeneous
node degrees distribution when the minimum node de-
gree is greater than two [11]. In addition, the spread
of epidemics was studied on correlated networks and un-
correlated networks separately. Thus, we concluded that
properties (e.g. epidemic threshold) of previous models
are not generalized, and therefore the properties depend
on the network structure (e.g. scale-free, small-world,
correlated, uncorrelated, regular, exponential, ... etc).
Moreover, given the network topology and a suitable SIR
model, assessing the vulnerability of the network with re-
spect to the spread of epidemics is difficult. In fact, the
epidemic threshold is not always a complete vulnerabil-
ity measure since it is a binary indication of the epi-
demic outbreak, and it does not account for the number
of infected individuals. Moreover, it has been proven
that an epidemic prevails on any SF network regardless
of its node degree correlation due to the absence of the
epidemic threshold in the limit of a very large number
of individuals residing in the network [11]. However,
within the class of SF networks, correlated and uncorre-
lated topologies exist, and they behave differently with
respect to spread of epidemics. Therefore, the epidemic
threshold is not an adequate measure, and consequently,
vulnerability assessment becomes a tough task.
In this paper, we propose a novel network vulnerabil-
2ity assessment method. The new method considers all
possible effective infection strengths that can harm the
network. We focus our study on SF correlated networks
to evaluate the vulnerability of disassortative and assor-
tative SF networks. Next, we present a novel individual-
based SIR model, which is inspired by the Markov chain
approach. We separately study the state of each indi-
vidual during the infection process, revealing the role of
the individual’s local connectivity in spreading the infec-
tion across the network. Although the exact SIR model,
based on the Markov chain stochastic process, describes
the global change in the state probabilities of the net-
work, it is limited to small networks due to the exponen-
tial divergence in the number of possible network states
3N with the growth of network size N . Instead, our new
model aims to reduce the complexity of the problem and
to offer insights into the epidemic spreading mechanism.
Through the new SIR model, we study the spread of epi-
demics on any type of network regardless of its topologi-
cal structure. Finally, we analytically derive the epidemic
threshold for the new model. We find that the new epi-
demic threshold is inversely proportional to the spectral
radius λmax (the supremum eigenvalue within the eigen-
value spectrum) of the network. We perform extensive
simulations to validate the new SIR model and the new
epidemic threshold. Quantitatively, we show that disas-
sortative SF networks are more vulnerable to the spread
of epidemics than are assortative SF networks given the
same number of individuals N and the same number of
connections L.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we shed
some light on the homogeneous and heterogeneous mix-
ing hypothesis models that exist in the literature. In Sec.
III, we introduce the new individual-based SIR model,
and we show how it is inspired by the Markov chain
model. We also derive the new epidemic threshold, we
determine the condition of the existence of a maximum
value of number of infected individuals, and we study the
role of the network eigenvalue spectrum on the spread of
epidemics. In Sec. IV we introduce the new vulnerabil-
ity assessment of any complex networks, and validate and
discuss our analytical findings through extensive simula-
tions. Finally, in Sec. V we conclude our work.
II. SIR MODEL
The science of the spread of epidemics is based on com-
partmental models that assume individuals are classified
into non-intersecting sets [22, 23]. Thus, the classi-
cal susceptible/infected/removed SIR model character-
izes diseases that lead to either immunization or death of
individuals. The infected individuals are in the infected
set, the healthy ones are in the susceptible set, and the
cured or removed ones are in the removed set. Initially,
a small number of infected individuals exist that try to
infect their susceptible (healthy) neighbors. After receiv-
ing the infection, susceptible individuals become infected,
and later they try to infect their susceptible neighbors.
In this case, infected individuals are infectious. Subse-
quently, every infected individual either is cured due to
immunization or removed due to death. This process was
early described by the homogeneous mixing SIR model
[22], which evaluates the change in the susceptible s(t),
such that infected i(t) and removed r(t) population den-
sities with time, while preserving the overall density at
any time t, s(t)+i(t)+r(t) = 1. In the homogeneous mix-
ing model, the rates of changes in densities are governed
by the following continuous time differential equations:
ds(t)
dt
= − < k > βi(t)s(t), (1)
di(t)
dt
= −δi(t)+ < k > βi(t)s(t), (2)
dr(t)
dt
= δi(t). (3)
These differential equations interpret the infection and
cure processes. Initially, the spreading process starts
with a small infected density i(0) ≃ 0, the susceptible
density is almost one s(0) ≃ 1, and the removed den-
sity is zero r(0) = 0. Every infected individual infects
on average < k > susceptible neighbors, each with an
infection rate β, where < k >=
∑
d dp(d) is the aver-
age node degree (average number of contacts), and p(d)
is the probability of having an individual with degree d.
Following the differential Eq. (3), an infected individual
is removed at a rate δ. The removed density increases
with time until it reaches a certain density level depend-
ing on the strength of the epidemic. A non-zero epidemic
threshold exist and it is equal to < k >−1. If the effective
infection rate βδ is above the threshold, the epidemic pre-
vails in the network. On the other hand, if the effective
infection rate is below the threshold, the infected density
is very small in the thermodynamic limit. Since on aver-
age every infected individual infects a constant number
of neighbors, the homogeneous model does not count the
heterogeneity in the node degrees of individuals in the
network.
Another model in the literature is the heterogeneous mix-
ing SIR model [11, 13], which was proposed to overcome
the shortcomings of the homogeneous model. In this
model, individuals are classified according to their node
degrees. Thus, for a given node degree d, the states’ den-
sities sd(t), id(t)and rd(t) evolve with time t, and their
sum is constant, such that sd(t) + id(t) + rd(t) = 1. The
rates of changes in the three states for a given node de-
gree d are governed by the following set of differential
equations:
3dsd(t)
dt
= −dβsd(t)θ(t), (4)
did(t)
dt
= −δid(t) + dβsd(t)θ(t), (5)
drd(t)
dt
= δid(t). (6)
The probability that a link is pointing to an infected
individual is given by the factor θ(t), where θ(t) is found
to be
∑
d dp(d)id(t)
<k> . This model was applied to both uncor-
related and correlated complex networks, leading to fur-
ther analysis of the epidemic threshold. For uncorrelated
networks, the epidemic threshold is τucr = <k><k2>−<k> ,
where < k2 > is the second moment of the node degrees.
On the other hand, the epidemic threshold for correlated
networks is τcr = 1
Λm
, where Λm is the maximum eigen-
value of the connectivity matrix Cdd′ =
d(d′−1)
d′ p(d
′ | d).
Although this model considers the heterogeneous connec-
tivity in the networks, it does not reveal the state of each
individual in the network. It only reflects the evolution
of the densities over time for a given node degree, while
neglecting the states of individuals within the same node
degree.
III. INDIVIDUAL-BASED SIR MODEL
In this paper, we present a new individual-based SIR
model in which each node can be either susceptible S,
infected I or recovered R with a given probability for
each state. The new model is inspired by the continu-
ous time Markov chain SIR model. However, instead of
considering the combinatorial states of the individuals in
the network, we study each individual deliberately [24],
by decomposing the infinitesimal Q3N×3N matrix to N
infinitesimal matrices, each with three states as follows:
qk(t) =

 −β
∑
j ak,j1[ij(t)=1] β
∑
j ak,j1[ij(t)=1] 0
0 −δ δ
0 0 0


where ak,j is the binary entry in the network adjacency
matrix, representing the existence of a contact between
individual k and individual j, and the indicator function
1[ij(t)=1] = 1 represents the event that individual j is
infected and zero otherwise. In this model, we replace the
actual event with its effective probability, and therefore
the event ij(t) = 1 is replaced by Ij(t) = p(ij(t) = 1).
For every individual k, we derive the system of differential
equations as follows:
dStatek(t)
dt
= qTk (t)Statek(t) (7)
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FIG. 1. Normalized new infected individuals as a function of
time for β = 0.1 and δ = 0.2 given correlated networks with
N = 104 and different average node degree < k >. Two differ-
ent types of correlated networks are simulated (a) assortative
SF networks, and (b) disassortative SF networks. The peak of
the new infected individuals in disassortative networks leads
to the corresponding peak in asssortative networks.
where qTk (t) is the transpose of qk(t). The obtained
differential equations are
dSk(t)
dt
= −Sk(t)β
∑
j
ak,jIk(t), (8)
dIk(t)
dt
= Sk(t)β
∑
j
ak,jIk(t)− δIk(t), (9)
dRk(t)
dt
= δIk(t). (10)
At any time t, each individual will be in any of the
states with total probability of 1, Sk(t)+ Ik(t)+Rk(t) =
1. In addition, the sum of rates of changes in the state
probabilities is zero dSk(t)dt +
dIk(t)
dt +
dRk(t)
dt = 0. There-
fore, we only solve 2N simultaneous differential equations
instead of 3N . Figure 1 shows the time evolution of new
infected individuals in assortative and disassortative SF
networks with different < k >=4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 given
β = 0.1 and δ = 0.2.
Steady-state population
To evaluate the behavior of the system of differential
equations at the steady state, we equate the differential
Eqs. in (8 - 10) to zero. The steady-state probability of
infection I∞ is always zero, while the steady-state proba-
bility of recovery R∞ always have a positive value, which
is δ
∫ tInew=0
0
uT I(z)dz where tInew = 0, the time at which
there are no more new infected individuals in the net-
work, and uT is the transpose of a vector of 1’s. On the
4other hand, the steady-state probability of being suscep-
tible S∞ is zero if, and only if, R∞ = 1, otherwise, it is
a positive value.
Epidemic threshold
The epidemic threshold is the condition that the epi-
demic prevails in the network. To compute the threshold,
we follow the analysis presented in [11]. We assume that
the initial fraction of infected individuals is very small
and therefore Sk(0) ⋍ 1. The differential Eq. (9) is writ-
ten as follows:
dIk(t)
dt
⋍
∑
j
˜Lk,jIj(t) (11)
where the element L˜k,j = βak,j − δδk,j is the entry of
the Jacobian matrix L˜ = {L˜k,j} = βA − δIN×N , and
δk,j is the Kronecker delta function and equals 1 forall
k = j. Since any element ak,j of the symmetric adjacency
matrix A is either 0 or 1, and according to Frobenius
theorem, the maximum eigenvalue λmax,A of A is positive
and real, the eigenvalues of the matrix L˜ have the form
of βλi,A − δ, and the eigenvectors are the same as those
for the adjacency matrix A. Thus, the stability condition
of the solution I = 0 of the differential Eq. (11) is −δ +
βλmax,A < 0, and the SIR threshold for any undirected
network becomes:
β
δ
<
1
λmax,A
= τ (12)
The threshold states that whenever 1λmax,A is greater
than the effective infection rate βδ , an epidemic does not
prevail in the network.
The existence of a maximum number of infected
individuals
The number of infected individuals increases in time
following a certain profile [25] depending on the infec-
tion strain. Below, we derive the condition for which
a maximum number of infected individuals occurs, and
how the condition is related to the epidemic threshold.
Let uT I(t) =
∑
k Ik(t) be the total number of infected
individuals in the network. The existence of a max-
imum value for I(t) is determined through du
T I(t)
dt =∑
k
dIk(t)
dt = 0, and we obtain:
∑
k

Sk(t)β∑
j
ak,jIj(t)− δIk(t)

 = 0 (13)
By rewriting Eq. (13) in the matrix form, we obtain
the following equation:
[
βST (t)A− δuT
]
I(t) = 0 (14)
Eq. (14) suggests the possible solutions for I(t) are ei-
ther I(t) equals zero, which happens at the steady state,
or βST (t)A − δuT equals zero. The second solution de-
rives a condition for the existence of a positive maxi-
mum value of I(t). Consequently, the second solution
AS(t) = δβu is on the form of Wx = ρx, where x and
ρ are an eigenvector and an eigenvalue of the matrix W ,
respectively. The vector S(t) is equal to the vector u
only if δβ is equal to the maximum eigenvalue λmax,A of
A, which follows Frobenius theorem and takes place for
t → 0 and S(0)→ 1. Moreover, this solution proves the
existence of the epidemic threshold shown in inequality
(12) whenever δβ < λmax,A, and therefore the epidemic
spreads in the network, and Sk(t) ≤ 1 forall k.
The effect of the network spectrum
To address the effect of the spectrum of the adjacency
matrix A, we write the rate of change as a total fraction
of infected individuals uT I(t) as follows:
duT I(t)
dt
= β(uT − IT (t)−RT (t))AI(t) − δuT (t)I(t).
(15)
Denote the vector of node degrees D = uTA, and the
eigenvalue decomposition of the adjacency matrix A =
UΛUT . We rewrite the differential Eq. (15) as follows:
duT I(t)
dt
=(βD − δu)T I(t)− β(UT I(t))TΛ(UT I(t))
−β(UTR(t))TΛ(UT I(t)) (16)
Let xj be the j
th element in the vector UT I(t), and let
yj be the j
th element in the vector UTR(t). We rewrite
the differential equation as follows:
duT I(t)
dt
= (βD − δu)T I(t)− β
N∑
j=1
λjx
2
j − β
N∑
j=1
λjxjyj
(17)
To relate Imax with the spectrum λj and the eigenvec-
tors U , let du
T I(t)
dt equal zero, and therefore we obtain
the following equation:
N∑
k=1
(dk −
δ
β
)Ikmax =
N∑
j=1
λjx
2
j −
N∑
j=1
λjxjyj (18)
5Since the matrix A is symmetric, we can see that
λmax is a positive eigenvalue and therefore the domi-
nant eigenvalue within the spectrum, and elements of
the corresponding eigenvector are positive as well. Eq.
(18) states that as δ decreases, the LHS increases, and
so Imax increases with the eigenvectors corresponding to
λmax, while on the other hand, the corresponding R de-
creases.
IV. VULNERABILITY MEASURE
We employ the individual-based SIR model to assess
the vulnerability of a complex network such that the total
number of new infected individuals reflects the vulnera-
bility of the network to the spread of epidemics given
any infection strength. In this section, we introduce a
new vulnerability assessment measure Ψ with respect to
the spread of epidemics, and we define it as the ability of
an epidemic to prevail in a complex network given all pos-
sible effective infection rates. Mathematically, we define
the assessment measure Ψ by fixing β = 1λmax,A and for
a given cure rate δ, the total number of new infected in-
dividuals is
∫ tInew=0
0
∑
k Sk(t)β
∑
j ak,jIk(t, δ)dt. By in-
tegrating over the defined range of cure rate 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1,
we obtain Ψ as follows:
Ψ =
∫ 1
0
∫ tInew=0
0
∑
k
Sk(t)β
∑
j
ak,jIk(t, δ)dtdδ (19)
Figures 2 and 3 show the numerical simulations of the
spread of an epidemic for 0 ≤ δβ ≤ λmax,A on assortative
and disassortative SF networks given different average
node degrees< k >, where δβ is the inverse of the effective
infection rate.
Previous work [26] introduced a measure that takes
into account the number of infected individuals at steady
state for the susceptible/infected/susceptible compart-
mental model. We use the new measure Ψ to evaluate the
vulnerability of correlated networks, these in which node
degree correlation is observed. They are also classified
as assortative and disassortative networks. For exam-
ple, social networks are classified as assortative networks,
while technological and biological networks are classified
as disassortative networks [27]. In assortative networks,
individuals of small node degree are connected with other
individuals of small node degree, while individuals with
large node degree are connected with other individuals
with large node degree. On the other hand, the opposite
is true for disassortative networks. Pearson assortativ-
ity coefficient [27, 28] was proposed to characterize the
node degree correlation numerically. However, it does not
give an accurate measure for networks with complicated
degree correlation functions. To accurately describe the
degree correlations, we evaluate the average connectiv-
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FIG. 2. Normalized total of new infected individuals as a
function of the inverse of effective infection rate for assortative
SF networks given N = 104 and different average node degree
< k >. The curve starts from the point where δ
β
= 0, and the
normalized total new infected cases is 1, and then it decreases
until it reaches the value zero when the value of δ
β
equals the
spectral radius of the network.
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FIG. 3. Normalized total of new infected individuals as a
function of the inverse of effective infection rate for disassor-
tative SF networks given N = 104 and different average node
degree < k >. The curve starts from the point where δ
β
= 0,
and the normalized total new infected cases is 1, and then it
decreases until it reaches the value zero when the value of δ
β
equals the spectral radius of the network.
ity of the neighbors of an individual k by following the
technique presented in [25, 29, 30]:
dn,n,k =
1
dk
∑
j∈neighbors(k)
dj (20)
The average connectivity of neighbors of an individual is
averaged overall of all individuals for a given node degree
d,
dn,n(d) =
1
Nd
∑
k/dk=d
dn,n,k (21)
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FIG. 4. Node degree as a function of average neighbors con-
nectivity dn,n(d) of individuals with the same node degree for
a sample of an assortative SF network with N = 104 and
< k >= 8. The node degree correlation is an increasing func-
tion for an assortative network.
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FIG. 5. Node degree as a function of average neighbors con-
nectivity dn,n(d) of individuals with the same node degree
for a sample of a disassortative SF network with N = 104
and < k >= 8. The node degree correlation is a decreasing
function for a disassortative network.
where Nd is the number of individuals of degree d. Fig-
ures 4 and 5 show two examples for correlated networks,
one for an assortative network and the other for a disas-
sortative network, respectively.
We focus on the vulnerability assessment of correlated
SF networks. We generate assortative and disassortative
SF networks using the algorithm in [31]. The algorithm
starts with a connected graph with m0 ≪ N individuals.
Every new individual is connected to the already exist-
ing individuals through two stages: In the first stage, a
new individual is connected to an existing individual k
with probability pik =
dk∑
j dj
; in the second stage, a new
link between the new individual and one of the neighbors
s of the chosen individual k in the first stage is added
with probability ps =
dαs∑
v∈Γk
dαv
, where α is an assorta-
tive tunning coefficient, and Γk is the set of neighbors of
TABLE I. Vulnerability measure Ψ for assortative and dis-
assortative SF networks given different average node degrees
< k >. The network size is N = 104.
< k > Assortative networks Disassortative networks
4 3.32 6.54
8 6.54 12.58
12 9.76 17.65
16 12.98 23.47
20 16.22 28.68
individual k chosen in the first stage.
To simplify the evaluation of numerical results, both the
constructed assortative and disassortative networks have
the same number of individuals N and links L with av-
erage node degrees < k >=4, 8, 12, 16 and 20. Next, we
apply the new measure Ψ in Eq. (19) to quantitatively
assess the vulnerability of both assortative and disassor-
tative networks. All the simulations are averaged over
10 runs. Table I summarizes the values of Ψ for both
types of networks for different average node degrees. We
notice that the disassortative networks have higher val-
ues of vulnerability measure Ψ than those of assortative
networks regardless of the average node degree value.
In addition, the Ψ value increases with increases in L
(i.e.< k >) due to the increase in the effective spreading
rate of any infected individual for its susceptible neigh-
bors. Moreover, in Fig. 1, we observe that the peaks
of normalized new infected individuals in disassortative
networks are greater than the peaks in assortative net-
works; meanwhile, the peaks in disassortative networks
lead the corresponding peaks in assortative networks. In
other words, an epidemic widely spreads in disassorta-
tive networks, and it spread faster than in assortative
networks. Fig. 1 also reveals insights about any future
immunization strategy that could be applied to both net-
works. For example, we can assume that immunization
strategies on assortative and disassortative networks are
different. Therefore, in assortative SF networks, mitig-
tion strategies are going to be more effective than in dis-
assortative SF networks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have reviewed the well-known ho-
mogeneous and heterogeneous SIR models, and we have
shown how both models do not evaluate the state of every
individual in the complex networks. To account for this,
we have presented a new individual-based SIR model that
is derived from the continuous time Markov chain model.
The new model evaluates the probability of infection of
every individual separately considering the probability of
infection of the individual’s neighbors. Unlike previous
models in the literature whose their properties require a
priori knowledge of the topological structure of the net-
7work under study, the new individual-based model can
be applied to any type of network regardless its struc-
ture. We have also derived the epidemic threshold above
which an epidemic prevails in the network. We found
that the reciprocal of the spectral radius of the complex
network is the epidemic threshold showing the role of the
network characteristics in the spread of epidemics. In ad-
dition, we have shown the condition for the existence of a
maximum number of new infected individuals, and how
it is related to the epidemic threshold. Moreover, we
have shown that the spectral radius and its correspond-
ing eigenvector of the complex network and the effective
infection rate determine the maximum number of the new
infected individuals. Furthermore, we have presented a
new technique Ψ to quantitatively measure the vulner-
ability of any type of network structures. We have ap-
plied the new measure on assortative and disassortative
SF networks, and through numerical simulations we have
shown that disassortative scale-free networks are more
vulnerable than assortative scale-free networks. The new
SIR model and its properties could have implications for
many systems that are viewed as complex networks, and
the new measure could rank different networks based on
their vulnerability with respect to spread of epidemics.
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